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Design of Formal Languages 
and Interfaces:
“Formal” Does Not Mean “Unreadable”
ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an introduction to a work that aims to apply the achievements of engineering 
psychology to the area of formal methods, focusing on the specification phase of a system development 
process. Formal methods often assume that only two factors should be satisfied: the method must be 
sound and give such a representation, which is concise and beautiful from the mathematical point of 
view, without taking into account any question of readability, usability, or tool support. This leads to 
the fact that formal methods are treated by most engineers as something that is theoretically important 
but practically too hard to understand and to use, where even some small changes of a formal method 
can make it more understandable and usable for an average engineer.
INTRODUCTION
There are many definitions of human factors, 
however most of them are solely oriented on 
human-machine operations in terms of system 
and program usability, i.e. on those parts that are 
seen by the (end-)user, but not by the requirements, 
specification and verification engineers. Neverthe-
less, many problems during the engineering phase 
are completely the same as by using the final ver-
sion of a system just because of a simple fact that 
many people sometimes forget: engineers, even 
those who are working on verification or formal 
specification, are humans too and have the same 
human abilities and weaknesses as people work-
ing in any other areas, from arts to construction. 
Moreover, developing safety-critical systems using 
formal methods means much harder constraints 
and stress than using a completed version of 
software application (e.g., using an entertain-
ment software, typing a personal e-mail using 
a smartphone, etc.) because of consequences of 
Maria Spichkova
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any mistake: a typo in an e-mail can lead to mis-
understanding which is easy to clear up, where a 
specification or verification error by developing of 
a safety-critical system, like a fly-by-wire system 
for airlines or pre-crash safety functionality for 
vehicles, can cost many human lives.
Nowadays, the research of human factors 
and of Human Computer Interface (HCI) mostly 
concentrates on the development of entertainment 
or every-day applications, but it was initiated and 
elaborated exactly because of mistakes in usage 
and development of safety-critical systems. For 
example, one of the widely cited HCI-related 
accidents in safety-critical systems are the ac-
cidents involved massive radiation overdoses by 
the Therac-25 (a radiation therapy machine used 
in curing cancer) that lead to deaths and serious 
injuries of patients which received thousand times 
the normal dose of radiation (Miller, 1987; Leve-
son & Turner, 1993). The causes of these accidents 
were software failures as well as problems with 
the system interface.
The Therac-25 was an extension of the two 
previous models, the Therac-6 and the Therac-20, 
but the upgrade was unsafe: the software was not 
correctly updated and adapted to the elaborated 
extensions in the system architecture. In this 
model, in comparison to the previous ones, the 
company tried to mix two system modes, a low-
energy mode and a high-energy mode, together. 
In the high-energy mode the filter plate must be 
placed between the patients and the X-ray machine, 
so that a radiation beam is used in a correct way. 
Because of some software failures the high-energy 
mode was used in the Therac-25 without the filter 
plate. This kind of failures occurred also in the old 
models, but it did not lead to overdosed accidents 
due to hardware interlocks. In the Therac-25 the 
company replaced the hardware interlocks with 
software checks, this result in a deathly overdosed 
treatment.
The HCI-related problem with this machine 
was that the Therac-25 in some cases displayed 
system states incorrectly and showed just some 
error codes instead of full warning or error mes-
sages, and, moreover, these codes were not even 
well documented. As the result, the operator of the 
Therac-25 was not able to recognise a dangerous 
error situation and continued the treatment even af-
ter the machine showed warning messages, which 
did not look like a warning or a signal to stop the 
treatment. Together with very little training, this 
caused the operators not aware of the importance 
of keeping the safety guideline and as a result, they 
violated many of the safety guidelines. In some 
case, the operators conducted the treatment even 
when the video and audio monitoring, which were 
the only method to observe the patient in separated 
room, were not working. These accidents have 
shown that studying the human errors and their 
causation should be a significant part of software 
and system engineering at least in the case of 
safety-critical systems.
An appropriate system interface which allows 
a correct human computer interaction is just as 
important as correct, errorfree behaviour of the 
developed system: even if the system we develop 
behaves in an ideal correct way, this does not help 
much in the case the system interface is unclear 
to the user or is too complicated to be used in a 
proper way. According to statistics presented in 
(Dhillon, 2004), the human is responsible for 30% 
to 60% the total errors which directly or indirectly 
lead to the accidents, and in the case of aviation 
and traffic accidents, 80% to 90% of the errors 
were due to human. Thus, it is necessary to take 
human factors into account by developing safety-
critical systems.
The fundamental goal of human factors engi-
neering, as claimed in (Wickens, Hollands 2000), 
is to reduce errors, increase productivity and 
safety when the human interacts with a system. 
Engineering psychology applies psychological 
perspective to the problems of system design and 
focuses on the information-processing capacities 
of humans. The goals of formal methods are almost 
the same: to reduce errors, increase productivity 
and safety of the developed systems, however, 
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the formal methods does not focus on the user 
of the system and the interface between the user 
and the system – they focus on the system itself, 
but only in very rare cases they take into account 
information-processing capacities of engineers.
In our approach Human Factors of Formal 
Methods, HF2M, we focus on human factors in 
formal methods used within formal specification 
phase of a system development process (Feilkas 
et al., 2011; Feilkas et al., 2009): on (formal) re-
quirements specification and on the developing of 
a system architecture that builds a bridge between 
requirements and the corresponding system.
The main ideas of the approach are language 
and framework independent, but for a better 
readability and for better understanding of these 
ideas we show them based on formal specifica-
tion presented in the Focus (Broy & Stølen, 
2001), a framework for formal specifications 
and development of interactive systems.1 We can 
also see this methodology as an extension of the 
approach “Focus on Isabelle” (Spichkova, 2007) 
integrated into a seamless development process, 
which covers both specification and verification, 
starts from informal specification and finishes by 
the corresponding verified C code (Hölzl et al., 
2010; Spichkova et al., 2012).
BACKGROUND
There are many applications of formal methods 
to analyse human computer interaction and to 
construct user interfaces, e.g., (Shackel & Rich-
ardson, 1991; Følstad et al., 2012), as well as a 
number of approaches on the integrating human 
interface engineering with software engineering, 
e.g., (Volpert, 1991; Heumann, 2002; Constantine, 
2003), but the field of application of human factors 
to the analysis and to the optimization of formal 
methods area is still almost unexplored. To our 
best knowledge there are no other works on this 
field, the nearest area is only the application of 
human factors to the development of engineering 
tools, however, there are many achievements in 
the HCI research that could be applicable within 
the formal languages as well as verification and 
specification engineering tools, for example, 
the ideas of the usage-centered approach for 
presentation and interaction design of software 
and Web-based applications were introduced in 
(Constantine & Lockwood, 1999; Constantine & 
Lockwood, 2002).
Speaking of any kind of science and research, 
one can say that a lot of new ideas are just well 
forgotten old ones, and a lot of newly developed 
methodologies are, in fact, the reinvention of the 
wheel. Leaving the research results solely in the 
area they are introduced, or just forgetting them 
does not have any benefit, vice versa, application 
of old ideas on a new field brings them to a new 
level and gives them new power to improve safety 
or, even more general, living standards.
Unfortunately, we should acknowledge that 
dealing with formal methods often assumes that 
only two factors must be satisfied: the method must 
be sound and give such a representation, which is 
concise and beautiful just from the mathematical 
point of view, without taking into account any 
question of readability, usability, or tool support. 
This leads to the fact that formal methods are 
treated by most engineers as “something that is 
theoretically important but practically too hard to 
understand and to use”, and, moreover, the term 
“formal” is for many people just some kind of 
synonym for “unreadable”, however, even small 
syntactical changes of a formal method can make 
it more understandable and usable for an average 
engineer.
Looking on the matter from a different stand-
point, we can see that most of programming 
languages have a formal background, even if this 
is not mentioned to programmers and engineers 
explicitly. For example, the Structured Query Lan-
guage (SQL) is nowadays a standard for managing 
data in relational database management systems, 
however it is originally based upon relational 
algebra and relational calculus – this side of the 
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programming language is generally unimportant 
to the SQL-programmers, being an important 
feature for the developers of the language itself.
Using natural languages, e.g., English, to 
specify a system we profit by their flexibility and 
power, we do not have any special learning efforts, 
because we can write the specification directly, 
without encoding. These advantages sounds very 
attractive, but considering a specification of a 
safety-critical system, their all are exceeded by the 
disadvantage that a natural language is ambigu-
ous, vague, and imprecise. A formal language, 
even if it requires an initial learning effort and 
uses a notation unfamiliar to an average engineer, 
is unambiguous and precise, and, moreover, 
due a predefined syntax and semantics a formal 
language is machine processible, i.e. using such 
a specification we could do some development 
steps (semi-)automatically.
Because of this image of formal methods, some 
approaches try to cover the fact they have formal 
background and “simulate” the appearances of 
informal representation to look user-friendly. In 
some cases it implies that the approach becomes 
semiformal or introduces extra specification 
ambiguity. For example, controlled natural lan-
guages (CNL) try to avoid disadvantages of both 
natural and formal languages and being a subset 
of a natural language have a well-defined syntax 
and semantics (Macias & Pulman,1993; Fuchs & 
Schwitter,1995). Their syntax is unambiguous, 
but engineers can interpret the semantics of some 
sentences in wrong way just because the language 
looks like a natural one and this gives a feeling 
it can be also used according to all rules of the 
natural language, i.e. the restriction can be ignored 
through lack of attention which is “provoked” 
by the visual similarity to the natural language.
A famous example of the misinterpretation is 
the sentence “I see the girl with the telescope”. In 
English, this sentence allows not only the interpre-
tation “I see the girl via the telescope” but also the 
interpretation “I see the girl which has a telescope”. 
Which one should be correct in the case of CNL? 
If we want to have an unambiguous syntax, we 
should take a choice. E.g., in Attempto Controlled 
English (Kuhn, 2010; Fuchs & Schwitter, 2007) 
only the first interpretation is allowed, but read-
ing such a specification it is very easy to forget 
this rule. Moreover, looking at the specification 
in controlled language, an engineer can consider 
that he does not need to know any rules, because 
he consider he can understand the specification 
without spending time on any additional training, 
whereas he misunderstand it.
Specifying safety-critical systems, it is not 
enough to use controlled languages and semiformal 
languages – the precise formal specification is es-
sential to ensure that the safety properties of the 
system really hold. Speaking about human factors 
according to the safety-critical systems we focus 
mostly on technical aspects; this idea, applied to 
the formal methods, is often called Engineering 
Error Paradigm (Redmill & Rajan, 1997). Hu-
man factors that are targeted by the Engineering 
Error Paradigm typically include the design of 
HCI as well as the corresponding automatiza-
tion: by this paradigm humans are seen as they 
are almost equivalent to software and hardware 
components in the sense of operation with data and 
other components, but at the same time humans 
are seen as “the most unreliable component” of 
the total system. This implies also that designing 
humans out of the main system actions through 
automatization of some system design steps is 
considered as a proposal for reducing risk. In 
the case of design of safety-critical systems, this 
means automatic translation from one representa-
tion kind to another one, e.g., between two formal 
languages or between two internal representation 
within some tools.
Another important view of the Engineering 
Error Paradigm is that human errors often occur 
as a result of mismatch in HCI and overestimation 
of physical capabilities of a person. With other 
words, human performance and reliability need to 
be considered in the design process (Klare, 2000); 
in our case, we have to focus on clearness – up to 
obviousness – and readability of formal specifica-
tions. For these reasons we have to analyse the 
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achievements of HCI approaches to apply their 
ideas on another kind of HCI – interface between 
(verification, software) engineer and the applied 
formal method or tool. The Individual Error Para-
digm (Redmill & Rajan, 1997) focuses on under-
standing the reasons why people make mistakes 
or commit unsafe acts, and then tries to eliminate 
those reasons. The same idea should be applied 
to analyse the syntax of a formal method: Which 
kind of specification mistakes and misreading is 
prevailing? How can we prevent them? Can we do 
it automatically or, at least, semi-automatically?
HUMAN FACTORS + FORMAL 
METHODS = HF2M
One of the common mistakes by writing a system 
specification, particularly writing a requirement 
specification, is the omission of assumptions about 
the system’s environment. The concentration on 
the question “What we want our system can do?” 
is very natural, but it leads to the point that the 
question “Under which constraints the correct 
work of the system can be ensured?” is ignored, 
however, the answer to this question gives us a 
crucial property of the system. To make this kind 
of mistake is even easier if we have additional ef-
forts through concentration on a formal syntax, 
but it is also even more disappointing in this case, 
after devoting much effort in the precise and un-
ambiguous specification. However, the solution 
to this problem can be really simple and uses the 
same principle as enriching an email client by an 
alert like “The attachment keyword is found. Do 
you want to add the attachment now or should we 
remind you later?”
Specifying a system formally we should have 
special alerts that remind us to cover this part of 
the system description. In the case of the Focus 
specification language this means to restrict all the 
specification styles (both textual and graphical) 
to the variants using the Assumption/Guarantee 
representation, where a component is specified in 
terms of an assumption and a guarantee: whenever 
input from the environment behaves in accordance 
with the assumption, the specified component is 
required to fulfil the guarantee. Thus, it will be 
impossible to overlook the question about the 
necessary properties of the environment, and if 
the system does not have any constraints under 
which it provides the correct functionality, the 
corresponding field of the specification should 
be filled out by the constraint “true” representing 
the property that the system should work cor-
rectly in any environment. The probability that 
an engineer signs this property without checking 
the corresponding system constraints is much 
smaller than in the case the engineer do not get 
any reminder to check these constraints.
As mentioned in our previous work (Spich-
kova, 2007), during requirements specification 
phase and the phase of a system architecture 
development we need to care about later phases 
(modelling, simulation, testing, formal verifica-
tion, implementation) already doing the formal or, 
even, semiformal specification of a system – that 
is, choosing an appropriate abstraction and mod-
elling technique. A crucial question is here how 
we can optimize the formal representation and 
formal methods with respect to human factors. In 
our approach we focus on the following aspects:
• Representation of the formal specification 
in more readable way, optimisation of the 
specification layout/formatting.
• Unification of the representation of differ-
ent specification views and artefacts by us-
ing an integrated specification language.
• Automatization of several aspects of the 
specification and verification process.
Let discuss these issues in more detail.
Layout/Formatting of a 
Formal Specification
The main aspect of HF2M is the representation, 
i.e. layout/formatting and visualization including 
graphical representation, of formal specification. 
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The first results of visual optimization of specifi-
cations are presented in (Spichkova, 2011b). That 
work covers all specification styles of the Focus 
framework – from textual to graphical representa-
tion, also covering on the timing aspects of the 
specification. The notion of time takes central 
stage for many kinds of safety-critical systems, 
especially in the case of embedded real-time ones: 
abstracting from the timing aspects we may lose 
the core properties of a system we represent, e.g. 
the causality property. To help an engineer to 
concentrate on the timing properties of the system 
to be specified and verified, we introduced so-
called timed state transition diagrams (TSTDs). 
Specifying system behaviour by TSTD we can 
use three specification styles: classical diagram 
(automaton), table and also textual style. Inter alia, 
we suggest to simplify the timed specification 
in the way to get shorter specifications that are 
more readable and clear: specifying a component 
we have often such a case where for some time 
intervals both conditions hold: local variables are 
still unchanged and there is no output. This can 
occur, e.g., if at this time interval the component 
gets no input or if some preconditions don’t hold. 
In classical Focus, as well as in Isabelle/HOL, we 
need to specify such cases explicitly otherwise 
we get an underspecified component that has no 
information how to act in these cases.
In many cases even not very complicated 
optimization changes of a specification method 
can make it more understandable and usable. 
Moreover, taking into account the Individual Error 
Paradigm, we can extend specification templates 
in order to get not only more readable, but also 
more correct specification, e.g. by introducing an 
obligatory assumption-part of the specification.
The simplest optimization steps are often 
overlooked just because of their obviousness, 
and it would be wrong to ignore the possibility 
to optimize the language without much effort. 
For example, simply adding an enumeration to 
the formulas in a large formal specification as 
well as extending the specification template by 
general rules makes its validation on the level of 
specification and discussion with co-operating 
experts much easier.
Figure 1 presents an example of this kind of 
optimisation. The first (basic) specification lay-
out leads to the situation where even a very short 
specification is hardly readable. In the example we 
have a specification which guarantee-part consists 
of just six properties, where even in middle-size 
case studies an average size of the guarantee-part 
is at least thirty properties; it is easy to imagine 
how unreadable could be a large formal specifica-
tion written using this kind of layout. The second 
specification has only tiny modifications in for-
matting vs. the first one, but even adding empty 
lines between properties of different kind makes 
the guarantee-part of the specification more 
readable. In the third specification we number all 
properties in the guarantee-part with the aim not 
only to improve the readability but also to make 
the discussion of the specification more concrete 
and free of misunderstandings.
1. Basic specification layout.
2. Specification layout with tiny optimizations.
3. Optimized specification layout.
In the HF2M approach, we see a formal 
specification as a ground to the discussion of the 
system properties, requirements, and structure, 
therefore the specification itself plays here a role 
of an interface between engineers of different 
disciplines (e.g., software and electrical engineers) 
and dealing with requirements, system, software, 
architecture, verification and many other aspects 
of the development. Thus, applying one of the 
basic design rules to a formal specification we get 
very similar results as in the case of development 
of webpages, interfaces, newspapers, etc. because 
of the nature of the problem that we are aiming to 
solve: problems in the information representation 
are very similar in any area, and the solutions 
from one area could be adopted to another one.
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Unification of the Representation
Another point, which is seen as obvious if we are 
speaking about interfaces and interaction, is the 
unification of the representation of any information 
we are dealing with (cf. also Figure 2). Specifying 
components and system in a formal language is 
helpful to have a possibility to change the view on 
the system or the kind of its description to cover 
several problem areas by a single specification 
language: this helps to simplify representation of 
different views on a system as well as to switch 
between them. However, it does not make any 
sense to extend the core of a (formal) language/ 
framework, because this can decrease readability 
of a specification – an overflow of additional in-
formation, which is not really needed to specify a 
concrete system on a concrete level, can distract 
Figure 1. Comparing different specifications layouts
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from the important properties and aspects. Thus, 
we need another solution of this problem. Instead 
of the reinvention of existing approaches, it is more 
sufficient to reuse within the formal methods some 
successful ideas from other areas. Analysing the 
similar problems within general software engineer-
ing, we can see that one of the effective ways is 
an extension of the core framework by a number 
of several add-ons covering different application 
areas and different functionality. According to 
this idea, we made the following “add-ons like” 
extension of the Focus formal language: 
• Specification of processes and matching to 
the representation of components.
• Specification of security-critical systems 
with respect to secrecy properties.
Specifying systems in a formal language, we 
often need to present not only components but also 
processes within the system. Even if the common 
practice to describe system parts is to use a compo-
nent view, the representation of system processes 
becomes more and more important: nowadays the 
process view and the data flow representation are 
a typical part of the development of interactive 
or reactive systems. Specifying both components 
and processes within the same language, without 
changing the framework, we not only increase the 
readability of a system specification but also can 
easier ensure consistency among these different 
views on a system: this extension of the language 
functionality allows us to have more precise and 
at the same time more flexible representation of 
the system.
For these reasons we extend the formal lan-
guage Focus by the theory of processes described 
in (Leuxner, 2010). A process is understood there 
as “an observable activity executed by one or sev-
eral actors, which might be persons, components, 
technical systems, or combinations thereof”. Each 
process has one entry (activation, start) point and 
one exit (end) point. An entry point is a special kind 
of input signal/channel that activates the process, 
while an exit point is a special kind of output signal/
channel that is used to indicate that the process 
is finished. We treat a process as a special kind 
of a Focus component having additionally two 
channels (one input and one output channel) of a 
special kind. These channels represent the entry 
and exit points of the process. 
Dealing with security-critical systems we have 
another question in the foreground: how we can 
combine system components that each enforce a 
particular security requirement in a way that al-
lows us to predict which properties the combined 
system will have (Apostolopoulos et al., 1999). 
Formal verification of software systems and es-
Figure 2. Unification of the information representation on the level of languages
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pecially reasoning about compositional properties 
is a challenge in particular important in the area 
of security-critical systems: combining system 
components which have a number of security/
secrecy properties, the most important and the 
most difficult question is to predict which of 
these properties the composed system will have. 
For this purpose we introduced in (Spichkova, 
2012) a representation methodology for crypto-
based software, such as cryptographic protocols, 
and their composition properties. Having such a 
formal representation, one can argue about the 
protocol properties as well as the composition 
properties of different cryptographic protocols in 
a methodological way and make a formal proof 
of them using a theorem prover. 
Using these extensions, on the one hand, we 
do not need to switch between languages, the rep-
resentation is unified to make the communication 
between different development team easier and 
the accurate specifications of different system’s 
parts more understandable, on the other hand, if, 
for example, the representation of cryptographic 
properties is irrelevant for the system we specify 
and verify, the engineer do not need to study 
the aspects of the formal language related to the 
security-critical systems. Extending the formal 
language in the add-ons manner we increase 
the specifications’ readability without the rapid 
increase of learning effort required by the formal 
language.
Automatization
Last but not least point in of HF2M is an appropri-
ate automatization of a number of steps within the 
specification and verification process, because 
the automatization not only saves time but also 
excludes (at least partially) the human element 
as the most “unreliable” in failure, according 
to the Engineering Error Paradigm (Redmill & 
Rajan, 1997). As the next step of or research, we 
are currently proving all the theoretical ideas of 
HF2M practically, using the AutoFocus CASE tool. 
AutoFocus is a scientific prototype2 imple-
menting on top of the Eclipse platform3 a mod-
elling language based on a graphical notation. 
This prototype uses a restricted version of the 
formal semantics of the Focus specification and 
modelling language (Schätz, 2004; Schätz & 
Huber, 1999; Huber et al., 1996). Specifying a 
system in AutoFocus, we obtain an executable 
mode, which can be validated by means of the 
AutoFocus simulator to get a first impression of 
the system under development and possibly find 
implementation errors that we introduced during 
the transformation of the requirements into an 
AutoFocus model. 
The following extensions of the AutoFocus 
CASE tool are in progress (Spichkova et al., 2013): 
the add-ons that allow 
• To generate formal Focus specification 
from the CASE tool representation.
• To edit in the user-friendly4 way a (gener-
ated) Focus specification represented in 
LaTeX.
• To write a specification using the pre-
defined templates.
The Focus generator produces a specification of 
the model by representing the formal specification 
in LaTeX according to the predefined templates 
restricting all specification styles to the Assump-
tion/Guarantee variant to exclude the loss of the 
constrains on the system’s environment. Using 
this generator we can, on the one hand, get a 
readable formal specification developed according 
the suggested optimisations, on the other hand, 
apply the HCI development methods within the 
common application area, development of the 
tools, focusing this time on the formal methods 
are „hidden“ by the modelling tool. 
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Even a readable formal specification is hard to 
keep up to date if the system model is frequently 
changing during the modelling phase of the de-
velopment. This causes the situation where the 
system documentation is often outdate and does 
not describe the latest version of the system: 
system requirements documents and the general 
systems description are not updated according to 
the system’s or model’s modifications, sometimes 
because this update is overseen, sometimes on pur-
pose, because of the timing or costs constraints on 
the project. This problem could be also be solved 
by using this add-on: we simply generate new 
(updated) formal specification from the model. 
The current version of the editor inherits the most 
of the functions an open source plugin TeXlipse5 
(e.g., the syntax check of the specification as well 
as syntax highlighting, code folding, etc.), and is 
extended by additional features such as 
• Focus operators as well as the main 
Focus frames: component and function 
specification.
• Several specification tables.
• Predefined data types and streams.
• Tool box for the predefined Focus opera-
tors, which allows a quick access to the 
most important features of the formal 
language.
This add-on is oriented on the features of the 
Focus language, but it does not require any special 
sophisticated knowledge, and this point leads us to 
the next step of our research: how can we represent 
the element of formal language in such a way that 
the language learning effort is minimized.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the 
future research directions is to investigate the 
possibilities of formal language optimization in 
order not only to increase the readability of the 
specification, but also to minimize the learning ef-
fort needed to be fluent using the formal language.
Another interesting direction is the tool-support 
of the methodology “Focus on Isabelle” (Spich-
kova, 2007). This methodology allows verifying 
properties of the system using the semi-automat-
ical theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. Using “Focus 
on Isabelle” we can influence the complexity of 
proofs and their reusability already during the 
specification phase, because the specification and 
verification/validation methodologies are treated 
here as a single joint methodology with the main 
focus on the specification part. Moreover, using 
it we can perform automatic correctness proofs of 
syntactic interfaces for specified system compo-
nents. Having an automatic translation of formal 
specifications from Focus to Isabelle/HOL we 
can apply the methodology not only in theory 
but also in practice.
CONCLUSION
In our work “Human Factors of Formal Methods” 
we aim to apply the engineering psychology 
achievements to the design of formal methods, 
focusing on the specification phase of a system 
development process. The main ideas discussed 
in this chapter are language independent, but for 
better readability and for better understanding of 
these ideas we show them on the base of formal 
specifications presented in the Focus specifica-
tion framework.
According to the Engineering Error Paradigm 
we optimize representation of formal specification, 
which corresponds to the classical HCI design, as 
well as add a corresponding automatization of a 
number specification and verification steps of sys-
tem design. This approach demonstrates that even 
small changes within a formal method can make it 
much more understandable, usable, and also safe. 
Moreover, in many cases it is sufficient to reuse 
within the formal methods some successful ideas 
from other areas where the similar representation 
or design problems were already solved.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Controlled Natural Language (CNL): A sub-
sets of a natural language, obtained by restricting 
its grammar and vocabulary in order to eliminate 
(or, at least, to reduce) ambiguity and complexity 
of the specification written in this language.
Engineering Error Paradigm: A particular 
kind of Human Error Paradigms, which focuses 
on the technical aspect of the system and interact 
between the human factor and the system. This 
paradigm sees the human factor as one part of 
the system.
Focus on Isabelle: A specification and 
verification framework, which is the result of the 
coupling of the formal specification framework 
Focus in the generic theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
Formal Method: A particular kind of tech-
niques (based on logic and mathematics) for the 
specification, development and verification of 
software and hardware systems.
Human Computer Interface (HCI): An 
interface between a user and a (software and/or 
hardware) system.
Readability: The ease in which text can be 
read and understood without ambiguity and mis-
interpretation.
Safety-Critical System: A system which fail-
ure could result in loss of human life or damage 
to the environment or valuable objects.
Specification: A system’s description repre-
senting the set of requirements to be satisfied by 
the system.
ENDNOTES
1  See http://focus.in.tum.de.
2  http://af3.fortiss.org
3  http://www.eclipse.org
4  A “user” means here a “software engineer”.
5  http://texlipse.sourceforge.net
